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Abstract 
This paper is a contribution to the empirical literature on quantification of labor law 
violation. It takes up the case of a relatively advanced developing country, Chile, which has 
a high degree of administrative and bureaucratic capacity. Using micro survey data, the 
paper establishes the basic facts of compliance with four dimensions of labor law: 
minimum wage, hours worked, having a contract, and having a pension. On average over 
the period 1990-2009, we find that the laws were violated in at least one of these 
dimensions for one third of workers. However, there are large and significant variations 
over time, across laws and by worker and firm characteristics. Simple tabulation followed 
by econometric analysis shows that compliance rates are lower for women, foreign born, 
indigenous and less educated workers; in smaller firms; and in agricultural regions. These 
initial findings frame a rich research agenda on compliance and enforcement of labor law 
in Chile. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Reform of labor law is central to the development policy discourse in developing 
countries, and in Latin America in particular. Proponents of deregulation argue that overly 
stringent legislation feeds informality and serves to hold back efficiency and growth. 
Opponents of deregulation argue instead that these laws curtail the power of employers and 
protect workers.1 However, both proponents and opponents seem to argue equally from an 
assumption of effective enforcement of the laws. At least, they do not focus on issues of 
enforcement or violation of laws. In the extreme case, if the laws are not enforced at all, 
then the deregulators have the outcome they want by default and their opposition to the 
current laws is somewhat tangential. Even if violation is partial, both proponents and 
opponents will have to modify their arguments suitably. 
 
But, how much violation is there of labor laws? The question is at heart an 
empirical one, and dependent on context and institutions. A growing body of literature has 
attempted to quantify the degree of compliance.2 The broad conclusion is that compliance 
is far from complete, and the degree of violation varies across countries and across regions 
and sectors within countries.  
 
This paper is a contribution to the empirical literature on quantification of labor law 
violation. It takes up the case of a relatively advanced developing/middle-income country, 
Chile, which has a high degree of administrative and bureaucratic capacity. Using micro 
survey data, the paper establishes the basic facts of compliance with four dimensions of 
labor law: minimum wage, hours worked, having a contract, and having a pension. On 
average over the period 1990-2009, we find that the laws were violated in at least one of 
these dimensions for one third of workers. However, there are large and significant 
variations over time, across laws, and by worker and firm characteristics. Simple tabulation 
followed by econometric analysis shows that compliance rates are lower for women, 
foreign born, indigenous, and less educated workers; in smaller firms and in agricultural 
regions.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic legislative frame of 
labor regulation in Chile. Section 3 discusses the data source used in the paper. Section 4 
presents the main results, and Section 5 concludes with implications for policy and research 
directions. 
 
2. Legislation 
 
According to Chilean legislation, employers must comply with a number of 
universally applicable regulations, including writing and signing a labor contract, paying at 
least the minimum wage, providing a safe and healthy work environment, complying with 
collective bargaining agreement provisions, and contributing to the social security system. 
                                                 
1 See World Bank (2012) for a recent review of the literature. 
2 See for example, Strobl and Walsh (2003), Maloney and Nunez (2003), Kristensen and Cunningham (2006), Andalon and Pages 
(2008), Ronconi (2010), and Bhorat et al. (2012a).  
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In this section we briefly describe those regulations for which the available data allows 
measuring the extent of compliance.3  
 
First, employers must provide each worker with a signed copy of his or her labor 
contract. Having a written contract does not provide any direct legal benefit to workers 
(e.g., workers are not required to have a written contract to enforce their rights in the 
court). However, it presumably helps workers to know their rights and establishes pay, 
hours, and other expectations specific to the job. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the 
majority of workers in Latin America wrongly believe that they cannot enforce their rights 
without having a copy of the contract (Piza, 2009).  
 
The minimum wage (known in Chile as ingreso mínimo mensual) is set by the 
government and varies according to the age of the worker. There is, however, no variation 
across regions. The minimum wage is usually modified once a year. In July 2012, the 
monthly minimum wage was 193,000 pesos (386 USD) for workers aged 18 to 65 and 
144,079 pesos (288 USD) for workers younger than 18 or older than 65 working full-time. 
For part-time workers the minimum wage is proportional to the number of hours worked.4 
Since March 2011, the same standards also apply to domestic workers. 
 
The maximum number of hours per week that people can work is 57 (i.e., the 
ordinary workweek is 45 hours and overtime cannot exceed 12 hours per week).5 Before 
2005, the maximum number of hours was 60 (ordinary workweek was 48 hours and 
overtime 12 hours). Workers are required to receive overtime pay at a rate not less than 
time and one-half of their regular rate of pay.  
 
Finally, employers and employees are required to contribute to the social security 
system. Social security benefits include pension, unemployment insurance, health 
insurance, and workers’ compensation insurance. The total contribution represents 
approximately 24% of the wage, and the contribution to the pension system is, on average, 
12.4% (Aguila et al., 2010).6  
 
The legislation also determines the level of fines when employment, social security, 
safe and healthy, and labor relations regulations are violated. Fines usually vary depending 
on the size of the firm and in some cases depending on recidivism. Table 1 presents the 
values of fines in July 2012. 
 
                                                 
3 The Encuesta Laboral (ENCLA) allows measuring the extent of violations with some health and safety regulations, but we have not 
been able to access the micro data. Aggregate figures provided by the government (Dirección del Trabajo, 2009), show that 25.5% of 
firms do not comply with the obligation of having a safe practices manual; and 31.7% of firms with 25 employees or more violate the 
obligation of having a health and safety committee that includes workers’ representatives.  
4 For example, the minimum wage for an employee who works 30 hours per week is two thirds the above figures since the ordinary 
workweek of a full time worker is 45 hours.  
5 These limits do not apply to managers and to workers who perform their duties outside the firm (such as traveling salesmen). Different 
regulations apply to workers in the transportation, hotel and restaurant sectors.  
6 Ten percentage points go to the worker’s individual account, and the remaining amount covers disability insurance and the fees charged 
by the pension fund manager. The contribution to the pension system is entirely deducted from the worker’s salary, and the employer has 
the obligation to do it. 
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Table 1 – Fines for Noncompliance with Labor Regulations (in USD) 
Violation 
Size of firm (No. of employees) 
1 to 49 50 to 199 200 or more 
Written contract (a) 396 792 1,188 
Minimum wage (a) 792 3,169 4,754 
Maximum hours (a) 792 3,169 4,754 
Pension (b) 407 407 407 
Safe practices manual (c) 713 2,377 3,169 
Health and safety committee (c) 792 3,169 4,754 
Dept. occupational risk prevention (c) 792 3,169 4,754 
Notes: The law sets fines using two units of measurement (Unidad de Fomento for pension contributions and Unidad Tributaria Mensual 
for the rest) which are updated daily or monthly by the government. The table presents the figures in USD at July 2012. (a) Fine per 
worker; (b) fine per worker assuming lack of contribution during one year; (c) fine per establishment. 
 
3. Data 
 
The main source of data for this paper is the National Socioeconomic 
Characterization Survey (CASEN)7 from Chile, which is a repeated cross-sectional 
household survey. The survey is funded by the Chilean Social Development Agency and 
administered by the University of Chile MIDEPLAN8, INE9, and CIENES.10 The survey 
was administered every two years from 1990-2000 and every three years thereafter. The 
survey is designed to be representative at the national, regional, and geographic 
stratification (urban v. rural) level. The sampling unit is the household and sampling is 
based on census figures. Interviews are conducted in person.  The scope of the survey was 
gradually expanded in order to be representative for smaller communities and also to 
include more questions.11 CASEN contains question modules on health, education, work 
characteristics, home characteristics, and a variety of other socioeconomic variables of 
interest. The interviews are conducted in November and December of each survey year. 
 
This survey is ideal for measuring labor law violations for two reasons. First, 
employees are more likely to report their actual working conditions compared to employers 
since they are not fined in case of noncompliance. Second, the survey asks detailed 
questions of respondents about personal characteristics and the characteristics of their jobs. 
This allows us to match workers with the labor standards they are subject to. It also allows 
us to evaluate which characteristics of workers and firms are associated with higher levels 
of labor standards violations. Respondents are asked questions about their current work 
status, the number of hours they usually work per week (or month), and the number of 
                                                 
7 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional. 
8 Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación. 
9 Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas.  
10 Centro Interamericano de Enseñanza Estadística. 
11 The number of individuals included in the survey increased from 105,189 in 1990 to 246,670 in 2009. 
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days. They are also asked to provide detailed industry code information and details about 
their place of employment and position. They also answer basic questions about working 
conditions including whether they have a contract with their employer, if that contract is 
signed, if they have a pension, and what type of pension plan they have. 
 
The population of interest for this paper is workers who identify themselves as 
employees, rather than employers, bosses, or the self-employed, and who do not work in 
domestic service since a slightly different set of labor laws apply to those workers.12 We 
measure violation of the hourly minimum wage and calculate the hourly wage of a worker 
based on her or his self-reported hours and income and then classify the worker as under 
the minimum wage if that wage is less than the hourly minimum wage once the monthly 
minimum is scaled for the standard workweek of 45 or 48 hours depending on year.  One 
potential problem with this method is that self-reported hours and wages can often lead to 
measurement error due to recall bias or rounding which could result in mis-categorizing 
workers as in compliance or not in compliance with the minimum wage. An alternative 
strategy is to look only at full time workers and violations of the monthly minimum wage. 
However, while this often does estimate a slightly higher level of compliance, the increase 
in compliance is usually less than 1 percentage point. Additionally, the high level of hours 
violations leads us to believe that violations of the hourly minimum wage is what matters 
whether or not the violation derives from workers working more hours than their wage 
mandates or being paid less than their hours legally mandate.  
 
We use three measures of minimum wage violation based on Bhorat et al. (2012a) 
all of which take the form:  
 
Vα = E { [(wm – w)/wm]α if wm – w >0;   0 if wm – w ≤0 }.  
 
The first measure, α = 0, is the standard headcount violation measure. The other two 
measures of minimum wage violation are measures of depth: α = 1 measures the shortfall 
depth and all α > 1 places larger emphasis on larger gaps. We report α = 2 as a measure of 
the severity of minimum wage violation.  Additionally we report V1/V0  which measures the 
average percent paid below the minimum wage for all sub-minimum wage workers. 
 
Measuring contract and hours violations is more straightforward. Workers are 
classified as having no labor contract if they report either that they do not have a contract, 
or that their contract has not been signed by an employer. The alternative definition, where 
only workers who report directly that they do not have labor contracts (excluding those 
whose are unsigned), does not change the results in any meaningful way. Workers are 
classified as working more than the maximum level of hours (60 or 57) if they report 
weekly hours above the threshold or they report monthly hours above 4.2 times the 
threshold. Workers are classified as not having a pension if they report that they are not 
covered by any of the available pension systems (both public and private.) Finally, an 
overall measure of labor law violation is computed, which is defined as the share of 
workers with at least one violation in any of the four analyzed legally mandated benefits. 
                                                 
12 Only 5% of workers are in domestic service in the sample. 
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4. Results 
 
Table 2 shows the extent and evolution of minimum wage violations from 1990 to 
2009. Overall, almost 20% of workers covered by the minimum wage are paid below it 
during the analyzed period. The level of minimum wage violation was increasing from 
1990 to 2006 (with the exception of 1994). Table 2 shows that minimum wages were 
relatively flat compared to the average wage for prime aged workers in jobs covered by the 
minimum wage, but that it increased by comparison beginning in 1998. Between 2006 and 
2009, however, there was a large reduction in the level of noncompliance that coincides 
with a reduction in the minimum wage relative to the average wage. The depth of violation 
follows a similar trend. Workers paid below the minimum wage are paid on average 25% 
below, with a high of 26% in 1990 and a low of 22% in 1998. 
 
Table 2 – Trends in Violations of Minimum Wage, Hours, Contract and Pension 
Year 
Minimum Wage Violations Real 
Min. 
wage 
Min. 
wage/Avg. 
wage 
Hours No contract 
No 
pension 
Any 
violationV0 V1 V2 V1/V0 
1990 0.148 0.039 0.018 0.263 433.1 0.322 0.111 0.162 0.184 0.366 
1992 0.163 0.043 0.018 0.261 457.4 0.335 0.098 0.141 0.198 0.371 
1994 0.141 0.036 0.015 0.253 492.0 0.319 0.081 0.198 0.179 0.348 
1996 0.161 0.039 0.015 0.239 531.8 0.310 0.084 0.199 0.184 0.365 
1998 0.163 0.037 0.013 0.227 585.8 0.338 0.089 0.239 0.221 0.393 
2000 0.201 0.048 0.018 0.241 678.2 0.361 0.082 0.188 0.182 0.376 
2003 0.214 0.049 0.018 0.230 718.7 0.387 0.068 0.199 0.174 0.380 
2006 0.293 0.071 0.028 0.241 831.1 0.475 0.109 0.189 0.157 0.452 
2009 0.153 0.038 0.016 0.246 881.8 0.432 0.078 0.177 0.071 0.331 
Total 0.182 0.044 0.018 0.245 - 0.364 0.089 0.188 0.172 0.377 
Notes: Real minimum wage is calculated using the CPI from the Chilean Central Bank. Average wage is the average hourly wage for 
prime aged workers (25-55) subject to the minimum wage.  
 
Table 2 also presents measures of violations for the other regulations we study. The 
percentage of workers without a contract also increased during the nineties reaching its 
peak in 1998 at 23.9%, but has declined since then. The percentage of people without a 
pension follows a similar pattern as contract violation: 13 it increased during the nineties –
reaching a peak value of 22.1% in 1998– and declined during the 2000s’; unlike contact 
violations, it experienced a sharp drop between 2006 and 2009 of similar magnitude to the 
reduction in minimum wage violations. In contrast, maximum hours violations have a 
negative trend over the entire period that was only interrupted in 2006, presumably due to 
                                                 
13 Pensions violations are heavily tied up with contract violations: two thirds of workers without contracts also do not have pensions 
compared to only 6% for those with contracts. 
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the introduction of a new law in 2005 that reduced the maximum number of hours from 60 
to 57. 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the overall measure of labor violations. There is a 
positive trend between 1990 and 2006, and a large reduction between 2006 and 2009. This 
recent improvement is most likely due to more government enforcement: the number of 
labor inspections increased from an average of 102,802 per year during 2002-2006 to 
126,310 per year during 2007-2009 (Dirección de Trabajo, 2011). 
 
Figure 1 – Trend in Overall Labor Law Violations 
 
  
The rest of the results focus on differences in the level of noncompliance based on 
worker, firm, and geographic characteristics. Although the level of violations changes over 
time, the relative intensity of violation based on these characteristics does not. For ease of 
interpretation we focus on pooled measures across all waves of the survey. 
 
4.1 Worker Characteristics 
 
We broke workers into four age categories: 15-17 and 65+ which correspond to the 
lower minimum wage level and also evaluate younger workers 18-25 separately from 
prime aged workers (25-65). Table 3 shows that despite having a lower minimum wage, 
teenagers (15-17) have a higher level of minimum wage violation and a larger depth of 
violation. 32% are paid below the minimum wage and the average deviation is 31% below 
which is much higher than the 25% population average. Nearly two thirds of young 
workers do not have a contract or pension.  Over 9% of these extremely young workers 
reported working more than the maximum number of hours per week. Overall, nearly 80% 
of teenagers are subject to some form of labor standards violation. Workers 18-25 look 
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more like their older counterparts than teenagers but they still have higher levels of labor 
standards violations than prime aged workers. They have a higher level of minimum wage 
violation and a greater depth of violation. Prime aged workers are also 10 percentage points 
more likely to have a pension than younger workers.  
 
There are also interesting results for older workers. Since 65 is the retirement age in 
Chile, the selection into the labor market for those over 65 is likely to be different than at 
other ages. This is borne out in the data. While only 15% of prime aged workers do not 
have pensions nearly 40% of workers who are still employed after 65 do not have pensions, 
which is suggestive evidence that those workers without pension coverage stay employed 
longer. They are also much more likely not to have a contract. Conversely, these workers 
are also the least likely to face minimum wage violations (only 16.5% of workers14); 
however, the depth of violation is almost as high as for teenagers. Workers making below 
the minimum wage on average make 30% below the already discounted minimum wage.  
Older workers are also much more likely to have at least one violation than prime-aged 
workers: 57% of older workers compared to only 35% of prime aged workers. 
 
Table 3 – Labor Violations by Worker Characteristics 
 Minimum Wage Violations 
Hours No Contract 
No 
Pension
Any 
ViolationPanel A – Age  V0 V1 V2 V0/V1 
15-17 0.3247 0.1014 0.0499 0.3122 0.0934 0.5949 0.6505 0.7927 
18-25 0.2426 0.0588 0.0238 0.2424 0.0795 0.2487 0.2367 0.4628 
25-65 0.1710 0.0411 0.0161 0.2402 0.0905 0.1693 0.1464 0.3502 
65+ 0.1646 0.0489 0.0231 0.2968 0.0862 0.3488 0.3857 0.5730 
Panel B – Gender 
Male 0.1872 0.0453 0.0181 0.2418 0.1046 0.1948 0.1735 0.3903 
Female 0.1805 0.0439 0.0175 0.2435 0.0554 0.1779 0.1622 0.3495 
Panel C – Education             
<8 years 0.3446 0.0921 0.0392 0.2673 0.1000 0.3167 0.3005 0.5745 
8-12 years 0.2568 0.0610 0.0237 0.2376 0.1122 0.2416 0.2190 0.4780 
12-16 years 0.1360 0.0299 0.0112 0.2195 0.0838 0.1440 0.1225 0.3111 
16+ years 0.0244 0.0061 0.0025 0.2511 0.0519 0.0844 0.0715 0.1730 
Panel D – Immigration Status 
Native 0.2244 0.0544 0.0221 0.2424 0.0932 0.1828 0.1139 0.3915 
Foreign Born 0.1558 0.0370 0.0137 0.2375 0.1085 0.1787 0.1240 0.3817 
Panel E – Ethnicity 
Non Indigenous 0.2016 0.0479 0.0187 0.2375 0.0842 0.1886 0.1496 0.3772 
Indigenous 0.3132 0.0809 0.0337 0.2582 0.0970 0.2194 0.1806 0.4806 
Notes: Due to data limitations, immigration status is based on years 2006 and 2009 only, and ethnicity is based on years 1996, 2000, 2003, and 
2009 only. 
                                                 
14 This is likely to be in part due to the fact that older workers have a lower minimum wage than prime aged workers. 
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Panel B of table 3 presents levels of violation by gender.  The results for men and 
women are very similar. About 20% of both men and women are paid below the minimum 
wage and the depth of violation is almost identical. The strongest difference is that women 
are less likely to work more than the maximum number of hours. This is in part because 
women are more likely to be part time workers.15 We show below, however, that after 
controlling for education, women are more likely to suffer a labor law violation.  
 
The results for education are the most striking; workers with more years of 
schooling are less likely to be subject to labor standards violations. Figures 2 and 3 show 
the relationship between minimum wage and contract violations with years of education. 
There is a clear downward trend in the level of violations as education increases. 
 
Figure 2 – Minimum Wage Violations by Education 
 
 
                                                 
15 In Argentina, the extent of violation of the minimum wage is also almost identical for men and women, and hours violations are more 
prevalent among men (Ronconi, 2010).  
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Figure 3 – Contract Violations by Education 
 
 
This result can also be seen in Panel C of Table 3.  Workers with very low 
education (fewer than 8 years) have much higher levels of minimum wage, contract, and 
pension violations than all other education categories, and a greater depth of minimum 
wage violation. For workers with more than 16 years of education, minimum wage 
violations are almost nonexistent (3%) and the level of pension and contract violations are 
also low compared to the population as a whole. 
 
Finally, results vary by national origin and ethnicity. Panels D and E show that the 
indigenous population is less likely to receive any of the legally mandated benefits 
compared to the non-indigenous population. The difference is particularly large for the 
minimum wage (i.e., 31% of violations among the indigenous compared to 20% among the 
rest). The simple difference by country of birth suggests that foreign born workers are less 
likely to experience violations than native citizens, but we show below that this difference 
reverses after controlling for education and other factors. 
 
4.2 Firm Characteristics 
 
We looked at two dimensions of firm characteristics: firm size and industry. 
Violations differ greatly across industries as can be seen in Table 4 panel A. In agriculture, 
40% of workers are paid below the minimum wage compared to only 6% of workers in 
mining. Agricultural workers, in general, have the highest level of violations across 
categories with 37% of workers without contracts and 34% of workers without pensions. 
Overall, 63% of agricultural workers are subject to some form of labor law violation. 
Construction also has higher levels of violations than average with 41% of workers subject 
to a violation. 
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Table 4 – Labor Violations by Firm Characteristics 
 Minimum Wage Violations 
Hours No Contract 
No 
Pension
Any 
ViolationPanel A – 
Industry  V0 V1 V2 V0/V1 
Agriculture 0.3990 0.1060 0.0454 0.2657 0.0890 0.3610 0.3270 0.6268 
Manufacturing 0.1530 0.0332 0.0123 0.2173 0.0750 0.1460 0.1370 0.3232 
Mining 0.0610 0.0156 0.0065 0.2550 0.1210 0.0580 0.0610 0.2278 
Construction 0.1660 0.0378 0.0145 0.2275 0.0930 0.2240 0.1870 0.4117 
Services 0.1240 0.0521 0.0113 0.4199 0.0580 0.1410 0.1300 0.2901 
Panel B – Size (No. of employees) 
1 to 49 0.2336 0.0591 0.0241 0.2530 0.0953 0.2673 0.2462 0.4653 
50 to 199 0.1408 0.0307 0.0115 0.2182 0.0771 0.1113 0.0979 0.2891 
200 or more 0.1332 0.0303 0.0116 0.2271 0.0840 0.1097 0.0896 0.2865 
 
Violations also differ by firm size. Small firms have higher levels of violation 
across all labor standards, 47% of workers in small firms have at least one violation. The 
difference is most notable for pensions and contracts. Workers in small firms are over twice 
as likely not to have a contract or pension as workers in medium and large firms. There 
also appears to be very little difference in the level of violation between large and medium 
firms as can be seen in panel B of table 4. The firm size distinctions were chosen based on 
the rules governing labor standards violations fines. Larger firms are subject to harsher 
penalties if found to violate labor laws. 
 
4.3 Geography 
 
The level of violation is very different for urban and rural areas as can be seen in 
table 5. 39% of rural workers are paid below the minimum wage compared to 16% of urban 
workers and the depth and severity of violation is higher for rural workers. Rural workers 
are also twice as likely not to have a contract or pension as urban workers. This is likely to 
be in part due to industrial differences between urban and rural areas since agricultural 
workers have the highest levels of labor standards violations.  
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Table 5 – Labor Violations by Geography  
 Minimum Wage Violations 
Hours No Contract 
No 
Pension
Any 
ViolationPanel A - Region  V0 V1 V2 V0/V1 
Tarapacá (I) 0.1680 0.0386 0.0145 0.2300 0.1310 0.1682 0.1507 0.3711 
Antofagasta (II) 0.1055 0.0250 0.0100 0.2372 0.1093 0.1269 0.1187 0.3046 
Atacama (III) 0.1726 0.0414 0.0162 0.2398 0.1051 0.1508 0.1295 0.3517 
Coquimbo (IV) 0.2519 0.0614 0.0241 0.2438 0.0968 0.2365 0.2122 0.4579 
Valparaíso (V) 0.1970 0.0461 0.0178 0.2338 0.0972 0.1989 0.1728 0.3982 
O’Higgins (VI) 0.2440 0.0535 0.0203 0.2193 0.0681 0.2181 0.1881 0.4388 
Maule (VII) 0.3223 0.0834 0.0350 0.2588 0.0778 0.3000 0.2602 0.5146 
Bío Bío (VIII) 0.2612 0.0706 0.0303 0.2703 0.0945 0.2103 0.1759 0.4218 
La Araucanía (IX) 0.2962 0.0784 0.0332 0.2647 0.0875 0.2152 0.2112 0.4609 
Los Lagos (X) 0.2922 0.0710 0.0271 0.2429 0.1044 0.2081 0.1946 0.4546 
Aysén (XI) 0.1830 0.0395 0.0143 0.2159 0.0779 0.1502 0.1369 0.3411 
Magallanes (XII) 0.1093 0.0255 0.0099 0.2333 0.0856 0.1290 0.1125 0.2859 
Región Metropolitana 0.1148 0.0259 0.0099 0.2259 0.0822 0.1631 0.1508 0.3178 
Los Ríos (XIV) 0.2668 0.0655 0.0273 0.2455 0.0754 0.1585 0.0672 0.3859 
Arica y Parinacota 
(XV) 0.1798 0.0420 0.0158 0.2333 0.1265 0.1965 0.0911 0.4073 
Panel B - Urban/Rural 
Urban 0.1574 0.0369 0.0143 0.2343 0.0893 0.1694 0.1495 0.3470 
Rural 0.3856 0.1027 0.0441 0.2662 0.0824 0.3332 0.3174 0.5946 
Notes: Regions 14 and 15 are only administrative divisions in the 2009 data.  
 
There are also regional differences in violations. The highest levels of minimum 
wage violations are in the regions in the middle of the country which are more agricultural 
(excluding Santiago and Valparaiso which are more industrial) and lowest in the extremes 
of the country which are less populated. Minimum wage violations range from 11% in the 
farthest south region of the country (Region XII: Magallanes) to 32% in the agricultural 
Maule (VII) region in the middle of the country. Santiago has some of the lowest levels of 
violations with only 11.5% of workers paid below the minimum wage and only 16% and 
15% without contracts and pensions respectively. Lower levels of violation are also found 
in the north of Chile where mining and manufacturing are more important industries.  
Finally, the Los Lagos Region (X), where the country’s aquaculture (fish farming) industry 
is primarily located, has some of the highest levels of violation with 30% of workers paid 
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below the minimum wage and 21% without contracts.  It also has the second highest level 
of hours violations in the country. 
 
4.4 Econometric evidence 
 
The previous sections presented simple differences in the extent of labor violations 
across workers’ and firms’ characteristics. In this section we compute correlations 
controlling for the other variables. We estimate the following equation using the pooled 
sample: 
 
Labor Violationi = βXi + δZi + εi , 
 
where Labor Violation is equal to 1 if worker i does not receive at least one of the four 
analyzed benefits (i.e., minimum wage, pension, contract, and hours) and 0 otherwise; X is 
a vector of worker’s characteristics that includes: age, age-squared, gender, years of 
schooling, ethnicity, and nationality; Z is a vector of the characteristics of the firm 
employing worker i: size, geographic location, and sector of activity. Table 6 presents the 
results. In column 1 we only include age, gender, and years of education; in column 2 we 
add nationality and ethnicity; in column 3 we add firm size, and a set of dummies for 
region, industry, and rural sector. All models include year dummies and are estimated using 
a probit model.  We report the marginal effects (dF/dx). 
 
Table 6 – Labor Violations and Workers’ Characteristics  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Schooling -0.102*** -0.094*** -0.075*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0023) 
Age -0.064*** -0.048*** -0.050*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Age squared 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.047*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0147) (0.0164) 
Foreign born - 0.152* 0.155* 
  (0.0837) (0.0888) 
Indigenous - 0.101*** 0.080*** 
  (0.0262) (0.0275) 
N 390,896 120,645 120,645 
pseudo R2 0.082 0.069 0.093 
Notes: The DV is the overall measure of labor violations. All models include year dummies. Column 3 also includes firm size, region, 
industry and rural dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.001, ** 0.05, and * 0.1 level. 
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The econometric results tend to confirm the evidence based on simple differences. 
Indigenous and less educated workers are more likely to suffer a violation of labor rights 
controlling for other determinants. The size of the effects is substantial: An additional year 
of schooling reduces the probability of a labor law violation by approximately 8% and 
indigenous workers are between 8% and 10% more likely to suffer a labor violation. 
Differences by sex and national origin, however, appear to be relevant in the econometric 
results but not in the analysis based on simple differences. After controlling for education 
and other factors, women are approximately 10% less likely to receive legally mandated 
labor benefits than men and immigrants are 15% more likely to suffer a labor violation than 
natives.16  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents a first look at the extent and pattern of labor law violations in 
Chile. The major findings are as follows: 
 
 There was a rising trend in violation from 1990 till 2006, when the trend was 
checked sharply and government enforcement improved significantly. Despite the 
recent improvement, still one third of workers are excluded from at least one of the 
four legally mandated benefits.  
 While violations have been relatively minor for hours, they have been significant 
for minimum wage, having a contract, and pension arrangements. 
 There are significant regional variations around the national average—for example, 
for the minimum wage the national average is around 20% but goes from 12% in 
Santiago to 33% in Maule, and agricultural regions. 
 Smaller firms, which have lower fines and could be harder to reach by the 
enforcement agency, have higher rates of labor law violation. 
 Compliance is lower among women, foreign born, indigenous, and less educated 
workers. 
 
These trends and patterns raise a number of research and policy questions. A key 
issue which bridges research and policy is how enforcement effort on the part of the 
authorities can change the degree of compliance. There are some suggestions in the 
literature that enforcement can indeed improve compliance, but econometric difficulties in 
controlling for the endogeneity of resource allocation for enforcement make this a 
challenging identification problem.17 But, in addition to enforcement, variations in 
compliance across worker characteristics, in firm characteristics, and in regional location 
present a rich and fruitful research agenda.
                                                 
16 Similar results are obtained for each component of the overall measure of labor law violations. Results are available upon request to 
the authors. 
17 Bhorat et al. (2012b) and Ronconi (2010) compute two stage least squares estimates of the effects of enforcement on compliance in 
South Africa and Argentina using, respectively, the number of non-inspectors and election years as instrumental variables for labor law 
enforcement. 
 
 
17
References 
 
Aguila, Emma; Attanasio, Orazio; Quintanilla, Ximena. 2010. “Cobertura del Sistema 
Privado de Capitalización en Chile, Colombia y México”, RAND Working Paper 642. 
 
Andalón, Mabel; Pagés, Carmen. 2008. “Minimum Wages in Kenya”, IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 3390. Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labor. 
 
Bhorat, Haroon; Kanbur, Ravi; Mayet, Natasha. 2012b. “Estimating the Causal Effect of 
Enforcement on Minimum Wage Compliance: The Case of South Africa”, Review of 
Development Economics, 16 (4), pp. 608-623.  
 
Bhorat, Haroon; Kanbur, Ravi; Mayet, Natasha. 2012a. “Minimum Wage Violations in 
South Africa”, in International Labour Review, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 277-287. 
 
Dirección del Trabajo. 2009. ENCLA 2008: Resultados de la Sexta Encuesta Laboral. 
Santiago de Chile. 
 
Dirección del Trabajo. 2011. Compendio de Series Estadísticas. Santiago de Chile. 
 
Kristensen, Nicolai; Cunningham, Wendy. 2006. “Do Minimum Wages in Latin America 
and the Caribbean Matter? Evidence from 19 Countries”, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3870, Washington D.C. 
 
Maloney, W.; Nunez, J. 2003. “Measuring the impact of minimum wages: evidence from 
Latin America”, in Law and Employment. Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean 
edited by J. Heckman and C. Pagés. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Minesterio de Desarrollo Social. 2009. Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica 
Nacional (CASEN). Santiago de Chile: Minesterio de Desarrollo Social. 
 
Piza, Rodolfo. 2009. “Derechos Laborales en Centroamérica y República Dominicana.”  
Fundación para la paz y la democracia, Costa Rica.  
 
Ronconi, Lucas. 2010. “Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations”, in 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 719-736.  
 
Strobl, Eric; Walsh, Frank. 2003. “Minimum wages and compliance: The case of Trinidad 
and Tobago”, in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jan.), pp. 
427–450. 
 
World Bank. 2012. World Development Report 2013 Jobs. Washington DC.  
WP No Title Author(s)
OTHER A.E.M. WORKING PAPERS
Fee
(if applicable)
The Evolution of Development Strategy as
Balancing Market and Government Failure
Devarajan, S. and R. Kanbur2013-09
Urbanization and Inequality in Asia Kanbur, R. and J. Zhuang2013-08
Poverty and Welfare Management on the Basis
of Prospect Theory
Jäntti,M., Kanbur, R., Nyyssölä, M. and
J. Pirttilä
2013-07
Can a Country be a Donor and a Recipient of
Aid?
Kanbur, R.2013-06
Estimating the Impact of Minimum Wages on
Employment, Wages and Non-Wage Benefits:
The Case of Agriculture in South Africa
Bhorat, H., Kanbur, R. and B. Stanwix2013-05
The Impact of Sectoral Minimum Wage Laws on
Employment, Wages, and Hours of Work in
South Africa
Bhorat, H., Kanbur, R. and N. Mayet2013-04
Exposure and Dialogue Programs in the
Training of Development Analysts and
Practitioners
Kanbur, R.2013-03
Urbanization and (In)Formalization Ghani, E. and R. Kanbur2013-02
Social Protection: Consensus and Challenges Kanbur, R.2013-01
Economic and Nutritional Implications from
Changes in U.S. Agricultural Promotion Efforts
Ho, S., Rickard, B. and J. Liaukonyte2012-16
Welfare Effects of Biofuel Policies in the
Presence of Fuel and Labor Taxes
Cooper, K. and D. Drabik2012-15
Impact of the Fruit and Vegetable Planting
Restriction on Crop Allocation in the United
States
Balagtas, J., Krissoff, B., Lei, L. and B.
Rickard
2012-14
The CORNELL-SEWA-WIEGO Exposure and
Dialogue Programme:  An Overview of the
Process and Main Outcomes
Bali, N., Alter, M. and R. Kanbur2012-13
Unconventional Natural Gas Development and
Infant Health: Evidence from Pennsylvania
Hill, E.2012-12
Paper copies are being replaced by electronic Portable Document Files (PDFs). To request PDFs of AEM publications, write to (be sure to
include your e-mail address):  Publications, Department of  Applied Economics and Management, Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
14853-7801.  If a fee is indicated, please include a check or money order made payable to Cornell University for the amount of your
purchase.  Visit our Web site  (http://aem.cornell.edu/research/wp.htm) for a more complete list of recent bulletins.
